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Summary 
Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations are used to 
create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods 
such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments are considered but found to be 
too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this 
methodology is historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human 
interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities that 
were evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part, which can 
be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: (1) a numerical 
score of the probability of failure and/or (2) guidance to program management on critical areas in need of 
increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new 
method, data from a concluded vehicle program (U.S. Air Force’s Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime 
upper stage) was used as a test case. Although the theoretical versus actual probabilities of failure were 
found to be in reasonable agreement (4.46 vs. 6.67 percent, respectively) the underlying subroot cause 
scoring had significant disparities attributable to significant organizational changes and acquisitions. 
Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle 
development programs. 
Nomenclature 
a lower limiting score of root causes 
b upper limiting score of root causes 
E event  
F cumulative distribution function 
P probability of failure 
X random variable of interest (the score of root causes for any case) 
Ω sample space 
ω possible cases 
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1.0 Introduction 
Analytic methods to evaluate a launch vehicle’s probability of failure are frequently hardware-centric. 
Analysis tends to rely on component failure rates used in statistical analyses to predict the chance of 
failure of an integrated vehicle. The methods used in such approaches are sound and produce a defendable 
numerical results. However, assessments of historic launch vehicle failures repeatedly show that the 
underlying causes of failures generally originate from humans, rather than hardware component failure or 
other manifestations of poor quality control. 
This incongruity between presumed cause and actual cause is problematic when attempting to 
quantify a credible probability of failure of a conceptual launch system based on historic real examples. 
Although probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) are intended to do just that, they tend to be resource 
intensive to perform. Even then, their accuracy is subject to scrutiny. Figure 1 shows PRAs performed a 
dozen years after the first shuttle launch (and also after the Challenger Space Transportation System 
(STS) 51–L failure) produced failure probabilities that were many times more optimistic than the actual 
risk progression was (calculated after shuttle retirement) (Ref. 1). As will be discussed, much of the 
optimistic assessments can be attributed to the lack of addressing human causal factors.  
A concise, easily implemented new method, which accurately takes into account human causal 
factors, is developed here to quantify launch-system reliability for future concepts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.—Actual versus predicted probability of failure for space shuttle system. 
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2.0 Proximate Versus Root Causes of Failure 
The distinction between “proximate” and “root” causes is given in NASA’s Procedural Requirements 
(Ref. 2): 
 
(1) “Proximate Cause: The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed 
immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its occurrence and, if eliminated 
or modified, would have prevented the undesired outcome. Also known as the direct cause(s).” 
(2) “Root Cause: An event or condition that is an organizational factor that existed before the 
intermediate cause and directly resulted in its occurrence (thus indirectly it caused or contributed 
to the proximate cause and subsequent undesired outcome) and; if eliminated or modified, would 
have prevented the intermediate cause from occurring, and the undesired outcome. Typically, 
multiple root causes contribute to an undesired outcome.” 
 
As will be illustrated, root causes of most launch vehicle failures (despite differing proximate causes) 
share a lot of similarities. For example, in the case of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Titan IVB/Centaur 
launch of a Milstar spacecraft failure in 1999, the vehicle tumbled during the Centaur upper stage phase 
of flight, which left the payload in a useless orbit. The proximate cause of the failure found by the 
accident investigation board was a loss of Centaur upper stage roll control due to a software error. 
Specifically, a value of an exponent within the flight software was entered as a “zero” instead of a “one.” 
The root causes, however, were human in nature, where “the software development process that allowed a 
human error to go undetected” (Ref. 3): 
 
(1) Human entered erroneous flight constants. 
(2) Human software checks failed to detect the error due to lack of understanding by staff. 
(3) Software testing lacked formality and was performed with default values (not the entered flight 
values). 
(4) Cape personnel did not diligently follow up when they noticed something atypical. 
3.0 Existing Methods to Assess Probability of Failure 
It is reasonable to assume that such a mature field would have created methods to assess probability 
of failure for entire aerospace systems that included human-centric root causes. Discussions were held 
with the NASA Headquarters Safety Center and the NASA Glenn Research Center Safety, Reliability and 
Quality Assurance Branch, and literature searches were performed on the subject. Two comprehensive 
documents were identified and reviewed. 
3.1 NASA Headquarters Study of Human Reliability Analysis Methods 
There have been approximately 50 different methods to assess and predict complex system 
probability of failure developed over the past half-century (Ref. 4). Most of these methods were created to 
assist the nuclear power industry and are largely hardware centric. Out of these 50 methods, 14 were 
selected by NASA Headquarters (HQ) for further study based on their applicability for launch vehicle 
failure assessments (Ref. 4). This subset was predicated on methods that contained human reliability 
analysis (HRA), which enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors for a more 
effective use of PRAs. Outside HRA experts were brought into the HQ study team from academia, other 
Federal laboratories, and the private sector. (Note that the existing NASA PRA guidance provides a 
method similar to those practiced by industry (Ref. 5).) These combined HRA and PRA techniques were 
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compared comprehensively in order to determine which were best suited to help guide the development of 
future NASA space systems. However, the HRA process (problem definition; task decomposition; and the 
identification, representation, and quantification of human error) was most readily applied to “bottoms-
up” initial design, analysis of individual tasks, and operating specific components or systems. The two 
initial HRA steps can become quite complex if not applied to clearly defined problems that are limited in 
scope. Even though there are commercially available software tools designed to facilitate this work, the 
process can easily become unwieldy if applied on an entire launch vehicle system. 
One of the methods studied by NASA HQ was human factors process failure mode and effects 
analysis (HF PFMEA) (Ref. 4). Originally created by NASA HQ, this method was designed to identify 
human errors and their consequences. However, HF PFMEA was designed to focus on specific 
subsystems that have a limited number of operation steps. HF PFMEA methodology then defines all 
possible combinations of acts a person could make in order to correct undesirable sequences of events. 
This produces a considerable number of possible scenarios and actions, making it unwieldy for 
systemwide application on a conceptual design. In addition, HF PFMEA does not calculate human error 
probabilities (a primary reason for it not being further considered in the HQ study). 
The HQ’s study chose 4 of the 14 methods for further assessment, finding them superior for space-
system development, each with varying strengths and weaknesses. Upon closer examination, each seemed 
unwieldy for assessing an entire space system (launch vehicle and its ground systems) from the 
perspective of known past (human) root causes of failures. Further, event modeling in the HRA/PRA 
process became even more tedious and complex for problems beyond a finite subsystem when using any 
of these methods. Since none of these methods appeared capable of assessing a launch vehicle system 
without requiring considerable effort, investigation continued for other methods. 
3.2 STAMP and STPA 
In a comprehensive assessment external to NASA, the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model Process 
(STAMP) was found to be a viable prospect using an all-encompassing accident model based on systems 
theory (Ref. 6). STAMP both analyzes accidents after they occurred and creates approaches to prevent 
them from occurring in developing systems. This method is not focused on failure prevention per se, but 
on reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through the use of constraints, hierarchical control 
structures, and process models to improve system safety. (Aside: a reliable system may not be safe, and 
vice versa.) In addition, its author takes exception to making a distinction between proximate and root 
causes, maintaining that the distinction is at least artificial and at most an obstacle to discovering the true 
causes of unsafe operations. STAMP’s top-down approach guides the user to produce “safety constraints” 
and ensure that they are enforced (rather than generating a time-sequenced “series of events”). This 
dynamic treatment of the launch system was proposed as a superior method to create an accident model 
(Figure 2). STAMP is very comprehensive, analyzing not just immediate causes of the failure but also the 
societal, organizational, cultural, and governmental environments surrounding it. 
The predictive part of the problem (a hazard analysis) was built on STAMP, using it as a preceding 
analysis. It was called the System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The primary reason for creating 
STPA was to include all causal factors identified in STAMP: “…design errors, software flaws, 
component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social 
organizational and management factors contributing to accidents,” precisely the human sources of failure 
lacking in many existing methods (Ref. 6). A primary output of this method is “functional control 
diagrams” rather than component (i.e., hardware) diagrams. The two overall objectives of STPA are to 
(Ref. 6) (1) identify every safety constraint that (if violated) could result in an unsafe or failed condition 
and (2) ascertain how each of these constraint violations could occur, including deterioration over time. 
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Figure 2.—Relationship of STAMP/STPA to new method and its underlying basis. 
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STAMP/STPA guides the design process rather than requires the design to exist beforehand, making 
it attractive for conceptual design applications. Thus, the composite STAMP/STPA method, based largely 
on human factors, might be used to more accurately predict a systemwide probability of failure. However, 
as with the four methods assessed in the NASA HQ study, the STAMP/STPA’s exhaustively detailed 
nature could drive the analysis to become unwieldy if it is not narrowly tailored to a specific subsystem. 
For example, Reference 6 applied STAMP to the failed Titan IVB/Centaur-32 launch, narrowly focusing 
only on the proximate cause of the failure: faulty flight software development and insufficient testing. Yet 
the resulting STAMP processes limited to the initial assessment of this specific cause of failure alone 
required 30 pages to summarize (Ref. 6). If this approach had been used to assess the entire launch 
vehicle system, it would have been overwhelming. Other examples were provided, also in Reference 6, 
that were similarly focused on the specific cause of failure, not a systemwide analysis. Although 
STAMP/STPA can be used for organizational and managerial issues, “Less experimentation has been 
done on applying it at these levels and, once again, more needs to be done” (Ref. 6). Thus, for similar 
reasons as the NASA HQ study, it did not appear that STAMP/STPA could be concisely applied to 
perform major systemwide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design. Reference 6 went 
further, suggesting that attempting to quantify human actions impacting future system reliability may not 
even be possible because of the unpredictability of human interaction with the surrounding conditions 
(questioning this paper’s premise). That assertion was rejected and a new method was created. 
3.3 Other Methods 
More traditional methods were also examined. These methods included models based on subsystem 
characteristics (both descriptive and functional) where all conceivable failure modes were attempted to be 
analytically described (Ref. 7). Here, assumed subsystem reliabilities by the authors were limited to 
technical parameters (no human factors) such as component life and vehicle configuration (number of 
engines, length time of operation, etc.). A similar method assigned subsystem reliabilities and then 
combined block diagrams and prediction modules to address functionality, operability, and other 
interdependencies of subsystems (Ref. 8). These methods appeared to be limited by lack of human factors 
and assumptions on hardware reliability statistics. 
Other techniques relied on past reliability improvements in the aggregate of various launch vehicles, 
which were then curve fitted and adjusted for various approaches to modeling reliability growth. These 
methods took into account the entire system (rather than components) and assumed that whatever past 
vehicle improvements took place would similarly occur in future vehicles. Each model had a different 
shortcoming in forecasting failure rates of future systems (Ref. 9). More sophisticated prognostication 
methods of this approach also exist (Ref. 10). 
Various NASA program standards and guidelines now recommend that some type of human factors 
assessments be performed, with no preferred practices. Either a Human Error Risk Assessment or Human 
Factor Task Analysis of some type is required to be performed, where the latter must “Analyze and list all 
the things people will do in a system, procedure, or operation” (Ref. 11). The overly broad “…all the 
things…” could easily result in significant effort. 
The above methods represent a considerable body of work. Nevertheless, the authors failed to find a 
method that reasonably prognosticates launch vehicle probability of failure for conceptual systems that 
was predicated on human causes. 
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4.0 Proposed New Method 
Since an existing, straightforward technique could not be found that relied on historic human 
causality data to assess the likelihood of failure of a conceptual launch vehicle on an entire-system-wide 
basis, the development of a new method was pursued. This new method was intended to guide conceptual 
vehicle design, development, and testing to increase the probability of success during operation. We 
propose this new method based on a rational probabilistic approach using historic data from accident 
investigation board reports. Figure 3 illustrates the steps to this approach:  
 
(1) Establish new method’s basis 
a. Review of past proximate causes of launch vehicle failures 
b. Establish root causes of past launch vehicle failures based on expert judgment 
c. Categorize, then consolidate similar root causes into finite categories 
d. Establish baseline model using root causes of past launch vehicle failures 
i. Selection of cases to be used 
ii. Scoring of root and subroot causes 
iii. Plotting resultant data 
e. Derive function for probability of failure of launch system 
(2) Apply new method: NASA/USAF Shuttle/Centaur G-Prime upper stage (as flown on Titan IV) 
 
It is important to emphasize that the first part of this process to “establish new method’s basis” is a 
one-time-only effort, reliant on the coauthors’ (from AEA, see Sec. 4.1) experience and judgement. The 
second part of this process to “apply the new method to conceptual designs” is the application of this 
method by the aerospace community on conceptual designs and development programs. 
How this new method compares to existing methods such as STAMP/STPA can be seen in Figure 2. 
Note that most of STAMP/STPA pertains to identifying proximate causes and root causes of specific past 
failures. Only the bottom-most part of Figure 2 (findings, recommendations, mitigation strategies, etc.) 
corresponds with (part of) this new methodology. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.—Approach of new method. 
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4.1 Review of Past Proximate Causes of Launch Vehicle Failures 
A comprehensive source of aerospace failure case studies was produced by two former NASA Glenn 
Research Center executives, now leaders of Aerospace Engineering Associates LLC (AEA) (Refs. 12 and 
13). They are coauthors of this report. Over the course of their 30+-year careers, they successfully led 
launch vehicle development programs and actively served in leadership roles on more than 60 launch 
teams. It is this comprehensive experience that was fundamental to establishing the credibility of this new 
method. At AEA, they reviewed and assessed over 50 NASA and international case studies of launch 
vehicle and spacecraft failures as well as other major system incidents, which became the database for 
this new methodology. The proximate causal data were obtained from accident investigation board 
reports, interviews with those directly involved, and subject matter experts. The failure case studies 
consisted of 26 launch vehicles, 16 spacecraft, and 12 other aerospace or major systems (ground systems, 
aircraft, and major test facilities, etc.). This was not intended to be an all-inclusive database of past launch 
vehicle failures; only the cases evaluated by AEA were used in the formulation of this new methodology. 
4.2 Establish Root Causes of Past Launch Vehicle Failures Based on Expert Judgment 
After analyzing the failures and their proximate causes, the coauthors from AEA developed specific 
actions to remedy the mistakes. The absence of these specific actions can be considered the root causes of 
the failures. They found that the nature of the root causes did not depend on the type of aerospace system 
(launch vehicle, spacecraft, major ground test site, etc.). Also, root cause types did not change with time. 
What did matter was that root causes attributed to humans dominated over those attributed to hardware 
failure. Indeed, they state, “An examination of space mission and other mishaps finds human error to be a 
dominant factor (Ref. 13).” Further, it was found that most failures had more than one root cause. These 
findings substantiate the major problem with aerospace systems probability of failure analyses stated 
earlier: whereas methods to assess probability of failure tend to be focused on hardware, the root causes 
tend to be human-centric. Although a human-factors-based method may be difficult to repeat consistently, 
lack statistical rigor, or be somewhat deficient in system engineering, it nevertheless would focus on the 
overwhelming majority of the true (i.e., root) causes of failure. Therefore, as long as the methodology is 
reasonably sound, a human-factors-based probability of failure assessment methodology should be more 
predictive and useful than methods currently used. 
4.3 Categorize, Consolidating Similar Root Causes Into Finite Categories 
There have been efforts in the past to categorize and consolidate similar root causes. The report by the 
Mishap Investigation Board of the Astro-E2 mission in 2005 had a graphic that illustrated “Recurring 
Project Themes from Previous Mishaps,” which documented 28 distinct possible root causes (Ref. 14). 
The coauthors of the current study have published an earlier presentation with (only) four distinct 
causation categories (one of which was subdivided into six subcategories) (Ref. 13). Upon reflection of 
the results in Section 4.2 above, it was felt that a dozen distinct categories were needed to adequately 
capture the various types of root causes without becoming unwieldy. Some categories were noticeably 
absent, such as “legacy hardware,” a frequent area of concern and topic of discussion. Yet it is the actions 
people fail to take with legacy hardware that mattered: insufficient testing, reliance on prior similar design 
requirements, erroneously assuming that implicit limits did not apply, and so forth. Testing was separated 
into two categories: system and subsystem or component. This was because system testing is designed to 
pick up integration and ambient environment issues, whereas subsystem or component testing is largely 
focused on individual self-functionality. Hardware and software failure root causes (the types that receive 
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a disproportionate amount of attention in other probability of failure assessments) were found to be 
relatively minor root causes of failure. Complete explanations of the subgroups within each category are 
as follows: 
 
(1) Insufficient or lack of prudent integrated testing is a major root cause of failures in launch 
vehicles. Not pursuing a “test as you fly; fly as you test” philosophy is a related characteristic. 
Without sufficient understanding of interactions within the entire system 
(which implies careful review and comprehension of data from an otherwise well-executed 
test campaign), the risk of system-to-system problems increases significantly. Test data of an 
operating system while in relevant environment (thermal, vacuum, vibration, etc.) are 
particularly essential for success.  
(2) Engineering errors can be in the form of faulty hardware design and/or fabrication. Incorrect 
analytical modeling (where the actual operation or the environment is not correctly represented) 
or computational errors (where engineers make mistakes), if left uncaught, can result in launch 
failures. 
(3) Unsound systems engineering (SE) practices have been a major impediment to mission success. 
Inadequate SE (correct design requirements, robust margins, etc.) by individuals lacking 
sufficient depth of experience, judgment, or critical understanding of the relevant technical field 
is captured within this area. Directly related are insufficient meaningful reviews (where major 
problems are identified, data presented and discussed, and decisions made), which are displaced 
by pro forma reviews with delayed critical decisions. SE experts are also expected to challenge 
analyses, heritage, and other assumptions in order to gage their soundness to substantiate their 
decisions. Analytic models not correlated with actual flight-derived data, scaled from other 
source, or of questionable validity are also expected to be rooted out by sound SE. 
(4) Insufficient or lack of prudent component or subsystem testing is also a major root cause of 
failures. Prudent testing prior to integration permits discovery while each subsystem or 
component is isolated from others. Relying on verification by analysis or comparison with 
requirements without first obtaining test data can give the program a false sense of security. 
Heritage hardware or software may appear to save money and effort, but not validating either 
for new application, range of operation, or a new environment can risk significant cost and 
schedule downstream. Lastly, forgoing lower level testing can result in overlooking the 
opportunity to establish instrumentation needs, which are typically first brought to light during 
subsystem-level testing. 
(5) Failure to follow established processes (or errors in processes) span fabrication, test, 
integration, and launch operations. Nonstandard events, loosely controlled changes, and 
workarounds not formally incorporated into the standard process (or not included in the 
program documentation) have caused serious mishaps. 
(6) Failures of hardware are categorized here. These root causes include random part failure, poor 
quality, and/or statistically out-of-tolerance components (–3σ). Also included here are multiple 
unforeseen changes in program, the environment, and secondary effects on hardware, where a 
low probability chain of events unfortunately appear to conspire to doom a mission.  
(7) “Better-Faster-Cheaper” is an expression originally coined by a NASA Administrator in the 
1990s and used as a basis for policy for creating and managing major programs with 
deliberately compressed schedules, highly constrained cost, and highly visible to the public. It 
is used here more generically to describe a root cause of failure that can be attributed to 
imprudently low funding and overworked staff due to an insufficient schedule imposed to carry 
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out policy initiatives. These conditions sometimes drove staff to take (or not take) actions 
against their better judgment, believing that resistance was futile. 
(8) Poor program management has been a highly visible root cause of failures. Inattentiveness to 
(or ineffectiveness in) managing problems even when they are program-threatening is chief 
among the characteristics. The “Normalization of Deviance” is something associated with the 
Challenger and Columbia Space Shuttle disasters: an unexpected deviation in system 
performance accompanied by revised expectations continue until a catastrophic occurrence 
results. Regrettably, also part of this category is lack of leadership integrity—such as provable 
knowledge that a program cannot succeed technically, yet senior management continues to 
spend money and consume resources until termination. 
(9) Failures of software are categorized here. Differences between functional specifications and 
true requirements can lead to software failures. An all too common aspect is insufficient (or no) 
independent verification and validation (IV&V), which invites broken software to remain 
undetected until too late. 
(10) Effective communication between organizations, management, and other members of the 
program’s broader team is essential. When it fails, the consequences can be devastating. 
Sometimes there are subtle, but fundamentally important, differences in how organization-to-
organization relationships function. Insufficient formality between working groups have led to 
unresolved action items that later proved lethal to the program.  
(11) Independent reviews are intended to surface problems that are complex, cross many department 
or system lines of authority, are too subtle for all but the most experienced staff to identify, 
and/or have escaped all customary checks and balances. Sometimes reviews are treated as pro 
forma, where true problems are either ignored or rationalized. An absence of independent 
assessment sometimes occurs in programs, where a conflict of interest gets in the way of the 
duty to hold the review. There have been occasions where the independent review has 
functioned well, yet the program for whatever reason fails to heed or fully implement the 
recommendations. Despite experienced and diligent program managers, sometimes bad things 
just happen. 
(12) There are other root causes of failure, sometimes unique to a specific program but just as 
devastating: for example, the urgency to compete with a foreign adversary may push a 
program’s leadership to act (or not act) in a way he would otherwise not; or an extremely 
talented, well-respected leader might have such an inspiring effect on his staff that his untimely 
departure may cause everyone to lose faith in the project. 
4.4 Assessment of Root Causes 
The root causes of each failure case were grouped into the 12 categories previously described as 
similarities became apparent. The groupings were then tallied and are shown in Figure 4. There is a fairly 
even distribution among the human-failure-based root causes with no clearly dominant category. The 
leading root causes are lack of sufficient testing (both integrated system and component), lack of 
appropriate systems engineering, and engineering and process errors—altogether totaling 63 percent. 
All human-factor root causes amount to 87 percent, whereas hardware failures, by contrast, contribute 
less than 9 percent. In fact, there is only a single case where random hardware component failure was the 
sole root cause (Ref. 13). These results indicate that focusing on only one or two root causes to assess the 
probability of failure would be inadequate and that emphasizing statistical hardware failure would be 
misplaced focus. This assessment confirms that a multifaceted approach focusing on a variety of 
human causal factors is needed. 
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Figure 4.—Distribution of root causes in launch vehicle system failures. 
4.5 Downselection of Cases To Be Used for Basis of Method 
Not all cases that were assessed in References 12 and 13 were used in the analysis employed by the 
new method. Desiring the largest reasonable sample space initially inspired the inclusion of the spacecraft 
failures as well as those of the launch vehicles. Both types of vehicles had similar characteristics from a 
general engineering perspective, and indeed, the failure mechanisms were similar (if not the same). 
However, a practical problem became obvious when the statistical part of this methodology was exercised 
(Section 4.8): how to account for the numerical total of spacecraft in the sample space? Although the total 
number of launch vehicles in the sample space can be reasonably quantified given their near similarity, it 
became problematic when addressing spacecraft. For example, should all Intelsats be grouped together or 
just within series? How should “one-of-a-kind” interplanetary spacecraft such as Galileo be treated? 
Even though the qualitative (color-coded) part of this methodology could be useful for spacecraft, the 
quantitative part of calculating failures per total sample space was problematic. Since there was a small, 
but adequate, number of launch vehicle cases, a practical decision was made to exclude spacecraft in the 
analysis. Another concern over which launch vehicle cases should be included was raised with respect to 
using only “operational” vehicles and avoid “test or research and development (R&D) infant mortality.” 
However, that would have reduced the total sample set to a mere 14. Further, the characteristics of the 
R&D failures were very similar to those of the operational vehicle failures. So it was decided to include 
all launch vehicle failures contained in References 12 and 13, while excluding the spacecraft and other 
systems. Thus, of the 54 cases in the total database, a subset of 21 case studies of launch vehicles only 
(both “development” and “operational”) were selected as the basis for this methodology (Table I). 
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TABLE I.—SELECTED FAILURE CASE STUDIES OF LAUNCH VEHICLE SYSTEMS 
Mission Problem Result Number in 
series 
Description of series 
Research and development 
1 Atlas/Centaur F-1 Premature shield separation Loss of mission 8 
Test flights:  
7 LeRCa led + F-1 
2 Atlas/Centaur  AC-5 
Premature booster 
engine shutdown 
Loss of mission, 
pad  See AC F-1 
3 bN-1, no. 1  Stage 1 failure Loss of mission 4 Four N-1s in series 
4 bN-1, no. 2  T–0 explosion Loss of mission, pad  See N-1, no. 1 
5 bN-1, no. 3  Uncontrolled roll Loss of mission  See N-1, no. 1 
6 bN-1, no. 4  Pogoc Program termination  See N-1, no. 1 
7 Titan IIIE/Centaur TC-1 
Centaur engine start 
failure Loss of mission 1 Test flight only 
8 X-43A Loss of control Loss of mission 3 Three (expendable) vehicles;  one failure 
Operational 
1 Apollo 13 Service Module LOX
d tank explosion Loss of mission 20 Total service module flights 
2 Apollo 13 Stage II Pogob Potential loss of mission 13 Total Saturn V flights 
3 Ariane 5 (501) Loss of control Loss of mission 92 Total up through May 2017 
4 Atlas/Centaur  AC-21 
Fairing separation 
failure Loss of mission 61 
Total nontest flight AC up to 
1990 (AC-69) 
5 Atlas/Centaur  AC-24 
Avionics hardware 
failure Loss of mission  See AC-21 
6 Atlas/Centaur  AC-33 Loss of control Loss of mission  See AC-21 
7 Atlas/Centaur  AC-43 Booster engine failure Loss of mission  See AC-21 
8 Atlas/Centaur  AC-62 
Loss of control during 
coast 
Compromised 
mission  See AC-21 
9 Atlas/Centaur  AC-67 Lightning strike Loss of mission  See AC-21 
10 Space Shuttle  Challenger SRM
e failure Loss of mission 135 Total space shuttle flights 
11 Space Shuttle  Columbia 
Launch-induced wing 
damage Loss of mission  See Space Shuttle Challenger 
12 Titan IIIE/Centaur  TC-6 
Stage 2 LOXd tank 
problem 
Potential loss of 
mission 6 Post TC-1 
13 Titan IVB/Centaur-32 Loss of control Loss of mission 16 Total Titan IV/Centaur flights 
Total 359  
aNASA Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center.  
bRussian rocket. 
cEngine oscillation (caused by combustion instability) in resonance with vehicle’s natural frequencies. 
dLiquid oxygen. 
eSolid rocket motor. 
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4.6 Scoring of Root and Subroot Causes With Requisite Expertise 
The scoring for the first part of the methodology was done based on judgment of the root causes 
identified in References 12 and 13. “Expert judgment” credibility of both AEA coauthors of this 
report was established and demonstrated by their successful engineering and managerial leadership of 
several launch vehicle developments, more than 60 launches spanning over three decades, accident 
investigation boards, and several major conceptual launch vehicle design studies. Such experience and 
demonstrated accomplishments were essential in order to correctly identify and judge roots causes of 
past failures. Credibility to score the second part of the methodology—applying the root cause basis to a 
conceptual design—required much less experience: at least one launch vehicle development program 
(doing actual engineering and project management) that resulted in a successful launch. Further, active 
launch team member experience was essential (i.e., on console with lead responsibilities during at least 
one successful countdown.) 
The definitions of the root causes (though generally similar) varied somewhat in how they were 
characterized and discussed across the 21 cases (because the proximate causes were unique). It was 
therefore necessary to identify common “subroot causes” (at least two and up to four for each root cause) 
to ensure all aspects of each root cause was captured and properly categorized. Each failure summary was 
assessed on a qualitative basis (i.e., color coded) with respect to each subroot cause. Figure 5 explains the 
scoring scale. Initially, only a qualitative soring was pursued, as the main intent of this methodology was 
to alert the development program manager to those areas most in need of attention. A “green” score was 
assigned if there were minimal (or no) meaningful problems in that particular subroot cause area. A 
“yellow” score was assigned if problems appeared within a range of “correctable within existing program 
definition and resources” up to “prominent problems requiring prompt resolution” and possibly 
necessitating additional funding, staff, and/or schedule relief. A “red” score indicated even more serious 
concerns culminating in “serious problems threatening program viability” (either in technical feasibility 
or resource allocation). 
As the methodology of this analysis evolved, a lead representative of the program (which was the 
impetus for developing this method) expressed a strong desire for a quantified measure of probability 
of failure. The method employed currently by the program (predicated on the mean time between 
failures of components used as input to a statistical analysis) produces a numerical result. Therefore, the 
representative desired a quantified (numerical) result, not just a qualified one. It was for that reason 
numerical values were introduced for each of the dozen root causes in conjunction with the color-coded 
scoring. Here the evaluator was free to specify any decimal value between 0 and 1, with the color-coded 
subroot causes used as a guide: (0.0 ≤ green < 0.3), (0.3 ≤ yellow < 0.7), and (0.7 ≤ red ≤ 1.0) (Figure 5). 
An example of the scoring done on one of the 21 failure cases is in Table II: an assessment of the Titan 
IVB/Centaur-32 failure. The duality of this scale (color and numeric) allowed for either subjective or 
objective scoring. Although both means of scoring are subjective to varying degrees, it should be 
understood that what is being attempted to measure are human errors—which are, by definition, 
subjective. Although each root cause was distinct, it was recognized that they were not necessarily 
 
 
Figure 5.—Scoring scale for root causes of past launch vehicle failures (both qualitative and quantitative). 
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TABLE II.—SCORING OF ROOT CAUSES OF TITAN IVB/CENTAUR-32 FAILURE 
Root cause Score 
Subroot 
causea 
(qualitative) 
Root  
cause 
(quantitative) 
  
Insufficient testing (integrated system)  0.70 
 Lack of prudent integrated system testing   
 Not pursuing “test as you fly; fly as you test”   
 Insufficient understanding of interactions within entire system   
 Lack of test data of functioning system while in relevant environment   
    
Engineering errors  0.60 
 Faulty hardware design, fabrication   
 Incorrect analytical modeling, or computational errors   
    
Ineffective systems engineering (SE)  0.00 
 Inadequate SE, engineer judgment, understanding, resolution of critical problems   
 Insufficient meaningful reviews   
 Failure to challenge analyses, heritage, assumptions   
 Analytic models that are uncorrelated with actuals, ill- scaled, or of questionable validity   
    
Insufficient testing (components, subsystems)  0.00 
 Lack of prudent component and subsystem testing   
 Verification by analysis or comparison with requirements only   
 Heritage hardware and/or software: not validated for new application   
 Not establishing instrumentation needs   
    
Process errors  0.80 
 Fabrication, test, integration, or launch process not followed   
 Nonstandard events or work-arounds that have not incorporated into process   
    
Hardware failure (flight or ground)  0.00 
 Poor quality or statistically out-of-tolerance component   
 Multiple unforeseen program changes, environment changes, or secondary effects   
    
Faster, Better, Cheaper  0.00 
 Overworked staff due to imprudently short schedule   
 Imprudently low funding   
    
Poor program management  0.00 
 Lack of leadership integrity   
 Inattentiveness to (or ineffectiveness in) managing problems   
 Normalization of deviance (unexpected deviation, revised expectation)   
    
Software failure (flight or ground)  0.80 
 Differences between functional specifications and true requirements   
 Insufficient (or no) independent verification and validation (IV&V)   
    
Poor team communication  0.65 
 Organization-to-organization differences   
 Insufficient formality between working groups   
    
Insufficient use of independent review team guidance  0.00 
 Absence of independent assessment   
 Failure to heed or fully implement recommendations   
    
Others  0.00 
 International pressures   
 Loss of key leader without comparable replacement   
 Others   
    
Total  3.55 
aGreen indicates there were no or minimal problems; yellow, moderate problems impacting program viability; and red, serious 
problems threatening program existence (see Figure 5). 
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independent of each other. But the complexity of quantifying the interdependencies was thought to result 
in too many hypotheticals and assumptions, so the root cause scores were merely summed to produce a 
resultant total root score. Further, since the distribution of root causes was fairly even (Figure 4), merely 
summing the individual root cause scores appeared to be reasonable. 
4.7 Plotting of Resultant Root Cause Scores From Historical Launch Vehicle Data 
Each of the failure cases listed in Table I was scored according to the method described in 
Section 4.6. The resultant total root scores were plotted in the order of increasing total score of root 
causes (Figure 6). Scores ranged from 0.10 (for Atlas/Centaur-24) to 6.25 (for Russian N-1 no. 4) where 
the maximum possible score was 12.0. Conveniently, a somewhat uniform distribution of scores resulted 
from the assessment even though no deliberate attempt was made to arrive at such a result. Even though 
no generalizations could be made of the results, by observation there did appear to be a rough grouping of 
the lowest scores by the unmanned Atlas and Titan vehicles, followed by the manned space shuttle and 
Apollo/Saturn vehicles, with the greatest scores for the Russian N-1 vehicles. 
4.8 Derivation of the Cumulative Distribution Function to Calculate Probability 
of Failure 
Because every nonzero score represented a case of a failed launch, and increasing nonzero scores 
represented increasing severity and/or diversity of human causal factors, the probabilistic approach to be 
applied needed to take into account both of these characteristics. A cumulative distribution function was 
chosen to calculate the probability of failure of conceptual vehicle concepts. Concepts would be scored 
similarly as with the historic cases in Section 4.6, and then the probability of failure calculated by finding 
the corresponding cumulative number of failures of historic cases with that score or lower. Note that if the 
cumulative scoring curve in Figure 6 were to be expanded to include all of the launches that were 
successful, then the first part of the curve (as well as the corresponding bar chart) would be identically 
zero for all these cases. 
Since the cumulative distribution function can be set up as a probabilistic inequality where the 
independent variable can range from zero to some value, a two-conditioned cumulative distribution 
function can be set up as the difference between two cumulative distribution probabilities. These two 
probabilities are (1) the chance a score would be zero, representing the total number of successful 
launches out of the sample space and (2) the chance a score would be up to a nonzero score. These two 
bounding scores can be designated as “a” and “b.” Subtracting these two probabilities would yield the 
probability that a conceptual design would be both a failure and have a score comparable to historic cases 
with similar severity and/or diversity of human causal factors. The probability of failure of a conceptual 
vehicle system would then be of the form given by the expression P{ω | a < X(ω) ≤ b}, where the 
probability (P) of failure event (E) is a cumulative distribution (F) of (ω) possible cases, and (X) is the 
random variable of interest (the total score of root causes), which can take on a value greater than (a) but 
less than (b). It is important to realize that the summation of the number of cases corresponding to the 
scores (a) and (b) are used to calculate the probabilities (and not the scores themselves).  
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Figure 6.—Root cause totals per failure case and their cumulative percentage distribution. 
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Below is the derivation of the cumulative probability distribution function to be used to estimate the 
probability of launch vehicle system failure for future concepts. The cumulative distribution function F, 
where the random variable of interest X is the total of the dozen causal sources of failure (and whose 
maximum numerical value b), is given by 
 ( ) ( ) { }| ( )XX bF b P E P X b= = ω ω ≤   (1) 
The probability of a successful case (i.e., score = 0) is expressed as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ){ }0 | 0X XF a F P X= = ω ω ≤   (2) 
The number of case studies considered (the sample space Ω) is 359 (Table I). Within this sample space, 
there were 21 failures (i.e., 338 successes). Therefore, the probability of success of the entire sample 
space (where the maximum numerical value a = 0) is given by 
 ( ) ( )
359 210 0.9415
359x
F −= =   (3) 
The corresponding chance of failure is given by 
 ( )1 0.9415 0.0585− =   (4) 
which is approximately 1 chance of failure out of 17 attempts. 
The probability of failure for a conceptual vehicle is the difference between the probability associated 
with its nonzero score and that of a zero score (i.e., success). For example: a concept with a score of 3.60 
would lie between failed case no. 16 (score = 3.55) and failed case no. 17 (score = 4.25). There were 16 
failures out of 338 + 16 = 354 launches whose scores were less than 3.60. The probability that a case is a 
failure and its score was less than 3.60 is given by Equation (5), where Fx(a) corresponds to Fx(0)—the 
probability of a successful launch. 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]359 21 16| 0.9415 0.9861 0.9415 0.0446
359x x
P a X b F b F a − +ω < ω ≤ = − = − = − =   (5) 
This is approximately 1 chance of failure out of 22 attempts (i.e., a corresponding launch success of 
95.5 percent). 
5.0 Testing for Reasonableness of Probability of Failure Prediction 
In order to test the reasonableness of the predictions of this methodology, a comparison with actual 
ground and flight test data from real vehicle systems was needed. It is important to underscore that this is 
an assessment of the total vehicle system (not a single failed subsystem, as in Sec. 4.6) prior to operation 
compared to its actual total failure record at the conclusion of its program. Admittedly, this is difficult to 
do in retrospect. The following example attempts to do just that. To test reasonableness of this failure 
probability prediction methodology, the assessment described in Section 4.3 had to be performed on a 
comprehensive system description of sufficient technical depth. One optional, but recommended, part of 
the scoring was the inclusion of comments and source references for each score given. Although similar 
comments were not provided in the scoring done in Section 4.6, this example contains these comments as 
a means to substantiate the rationale of the score assigned. 
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Figure 7.—G-Prime upper stage applications. (a) Shuttle/Centaur. (b) Titan IV launch vehicle. 
 
The Shuttle/Centaur upper stage was a joint NASA–USAF program in 1981 to 1986 to develop two 
new configurations of the Centaur upper stage (“G” and “G-Prime”) capable of launch from an orbiting 
space shuttle (Figure 7(a)). Although the program was cancelled only months prior to its first launch 
because of the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, the essentially complete G-Prime 
configuration was immediately adopted by the USAF’s new Titan IV booster program. Eventually, the 
G-Prime was launched 16 times on Titan IV from 1994 to 2003 (Figure 7(b)). 
The vehicle’s highly compressed original development schedule was driven by the requirements of its 
first two missions: both were to fly interplanetary trajectories whose 1986 launch windows could not be 
missed. The Shuttle/Centaur Preliminary Design Review (PDR) was followed by a Critical Design 
Review (CDR) only 9 months later. The aggregate data in those PDR and CDR packages were the most 
concise and comprehensive technical description of the program (Refs. 15 and 16). In addition, a book 
documenting the history of the Centaur upper stage had a comprehensive discussion of the technical 
problems encountered during its development (Ref. 17). These three sources served as the basis for 
scoring using this methodology. 
Table III is the scoring of the Centaur G-Prime. It is seen here that although the Centaur was managed 
by the NASA Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center (LeRC), much of the NASA Johnson Space Center 
(JSC) management’s actions and decisions negatively impacted Centaur development. Many of these 
JSC-initiated impacts are reflected in the scoring. There were several potential root causes of failure noted 
in the scoring, but the leading problems originated with the disparate approach to safety by the two 
managing NASA centers of the shuttle and Centaur stack (JSC and LeRC, respectively), which was due to 
concerns over the large cryogenic propellant upper stage in the cargo hold of the manned space shuttle. 
The significant score in Ineffective System Engineering, specifically in resolution of critical problems, 
stemmed from the fundamental disagreement between management of LeRC and JSC on critical fluid 
dumping requirements in case of an abort. These significant, major system changes driven by safety 
concerns continued throughout the development and even as final launch preparations began. A score of 
0.70 was given because it continued to be a source of several prominent problems that required significant 
(and quick) resolutions. Safety problems were exacerbated by poor team communication, largely due to 
organization-to-organization cultural differences. While LeRC continually sought to resolve technical  
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TABLE III.—SCORING OF SHUTTLE/CENTAUR G-PRIME UPPER STAGE FAILURE 
Cause Score Supporting referencesa 
Subroot 
causeb 
(qualitative) 
Root  
cause 
(quantitative) 
 
Insufficient testing (integrated system) 0.50  
 Lack of prudent integrated system testing   
No altitude propulsive stage test at 109%  
Propellant-level indicating system mount failures 
Centaur integrated support structure, erratic operation 
of propellant valves (Ref. 17, p. 206) 
 Not pursuing “test as you fly; fly as you test”   
Structural dynamic test campaign, system integration 
laboratory for avionics hardware and software System 
Level III/IV 
 
Insufficient understanding of 
interactions within entire 
system 
  Most of Centaur adopted or leveraged from existing, long-heritage Atlas/Centaur program 
 
Lack of test data of functioning 
system while in relevant 
environment 
  Most of Centaur adopted/leveraged from existing, long-heritage Atlas/Centaur program 
 
Engineering errors 0.00  
 Faulty hardware design, fabrication   
System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and 
CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 Incorrect analytical modeling Computational errors   
System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and 
CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 
Ineffective systems engineering (SE) 0.70  
 
Inadequate SE, engineering 
judgment, or understanding; or 
failure to resolve critical 
problems 
  Repeated JSC safety-driven changes in critical fluid dump system interface between shuttle and Centaur 
 Insufficient meaningful reviews   System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 Failure to challenge analyses, heritage, assumptions   
Repeated LeRC challenging of astronauts’ liquid 
hydrogen concern with Centaur vs. shuttle external 
tank (Ref. 17, p. 197) 
 
Analytic models uncorrelated with 
actuals  
Ill-scaled or questionable validity 
  
Modal survey performed on test article, trajectory 
design code based on past Atlas/Centaur flight data, 
and others 
 
Insufficient testing (components, subsystems) 0.00  
 Lack of prudent component and subsystem testing   
System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and 
CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 
Verification by analysis or 
comparison with requirements 
only 
  System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 Heritage hardware/software: not validating for new application   
System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and 
CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 Not establishing instrumentation needs   
System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and 
CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 
Process errors 0.30  
 Fabrication, test, integration, or launch process not followed   
Observed lower quality manufacturing, transport, and 
contractor staff actions (Ref. 17, pp. 209 to 210) 
 
Nonstandard events, or work-
arounds not incorporated into 
process 
  None identified 
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TABLE III.—Concluded. 
Hardware failure (flight or ground) 0.20  
 Poor quality or statistically out-of-tolerance component   NA 
 
Multiple unforeseen program or 
environment changes, or 
secondary effects 
  Change from “Element” to “Payload” designation drove critical hardware changes late in development 
 
Faster, Better, Cheaper 0.50  
 Overworked staff due to imprudently short schedule   
Contractor, LeRC leadership 50- to 70-hr weeks year 
after year (Ref. 17, pp. 196 to 198), short schedule in 
1986 (p. 205) 
 Imprudently low funding   Joint NASA and U.S. Air Force funding at ~$2B (current-year funding over 4.5 years) (Ref. 18) 
 
Poor program management 0.60  
 Lack of leadership integrity   LeRC securing 109% Space Shuttle Main Engine throttle baseline (Ref. 17, pp. 205, 208, 209) 
 
Inattentiveness to (or 
ineffectiveness in) managing 
problems 
  
JSC integration staff rather than JSC engineering staff 
delayed technical and safety responses (such as fill 
drain dump) 
 
Normalization of deviance 
(unexpected deviation, revised 
expectation) 
  JSC shuttle lift capability versus commitment 
 
Software failure (flight or ground) 0.00  
 
Differences between functional 
specifications and true 
requirements 
  System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 
Insufficient (or no) independent 
verification and validation 
(IV&V) 
  System Level III/IV Program PDR (March 1983) and CDR (Dec. 1983) reports (Refs. 15 and 16) 
 
Poor team communication 0.90  
 Organization-to-organization differences   
JSC unresponsive to LeRC technical data requests due 
to differences in JSC staff cultures (integration group 
vs. engineering group) 
 Insufficient formality between working groups   
Sufficient technical working groups between LeRC 
and General Dynamics Space Systems Division 
 
Insufficient use of independent review team 
guidance 0.50  
 Absence of independent assessment   
No Non-Advocate Review convened 
Continued safety concerns by astronauts (Ref. 17, 
pp. 197 to 199 and 206 to 207) 
 Failure to heed or fully implement recommendations   NA 
 
Others 0.00  
 International pressures   NA 
 Loss of key leader without comparable replacement   NA 
 Others   NA 
 
Total  4.20   
aPDR refers to the Preliminary Design Review; and CDR, the Critical Design Review. JSC is the NASA Johnson Space 
Center; and LeRC, the NASA Lewis (now Glenn) Research Center. 
bGreen indicates there were no or minimal problems; yellow, moderate problems impacting program viability; and red, serious 
problems threatening program existence (see Figure 5). 
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problems stemming from the need to rapidly and safely dump propellants in the case of an abort, JSC 
was frequently nonresponsive to requests for technical data. Further, because of the designation of 
Shuttle/Centaur as a “Payload” rather than an “Element,” it was the JSC integration staff rather than their 
engineering staff, who provided responses to LeRC. These responses were frequently unsatisfactory to 
help resolve engineering problems at the Shuttle-to-Centaur interface and so were a continuous source of 
major problems; thus, a score of 0.90 was assigned.  
More moderate problems existed in four other areas that may or may not have been resolvable 
within the existing program budget and schedule. No propulsive altitude testing of the entire stage of 
Shuttle/Centaur was performed (Ref. 17). Propellant system failures and erratic behavior became apparent 
late in the development, as exhibited by the Propellant Level Indicating System mount failures and 
Centaur Integrated Support System propellant valve operation, respectively. There was no non-advocate 
review prior to the program start, which presumably would have surfaced some of the liquid hydrogen 
safety issues. In the area of poor program management, while LeRC management was proactive and 
determined to resolve intractable problems, the evidence of repeated delays, unresponsiveness to data 
requests, and inappropriateness of integration rather than engineering staff involvement on the part of the 
JSC management warranted at least a 0.60 score. Further, in the area of normalization of deviance, it had 
become commonplace for JSC to issue shuttle lift commitments that were not documentable and indeed 
incapable of being technically substantiated. This resulted in serious problems performing trajectory 
design and performance analysis by the Shuttle/Centaur program staff at LeRC. This also contributed to 
the 0.60 score. Lastly, the Shuttle/Centaur program achieved an admirable feat by going from proposal 
material to complete flight-configured stages at the Cape, being prepared for launch in a mere 4.5 years. 
The impressive technical progress in such a short period of time was evident in the major review 
documentation (Refs. 15 and 16). However, this was accomplished with considerable overtime by most 
of the leadership and many of the staff (Ref. 17). The favorable scores of zero (engineering errors, 
component testing, and much of the system-level testing) could be attributed to considerable contractor 
and NASA center technical expertise brought in from the operational Atlas/Centaur system to staff the 
new program. 
The resultant total system score of 4.20 produced a probability of failure of 4.46 percent. The final 
record of the Centaur G-Prime upper stage on the Titan IV booster was 14 successes, 1 failure, and 
1 “no-trial” (failure prior to Centaur phase). Thus, the actual system failure rate of 6.67 percent compared 
reasonably well with the predicted value. However, the most important result was the significantly 
different qualitative scoring of almost every subroot cause when compared to the Titan IVB/Centaur-32 
failure, even though the G-Prime upper stages were essentially the same. A likely explanation was the 
change in organizations. The Shuttle/Centaur of the 1980s was developed by NASA LeRC and General 
Dynamics, while the failure in 1999 came after the transfer to USAF Space Division and the Lockheed 
Martin Corporation purchase of General Dynamics Space Systems Division. This methodology presumes 
consistency in organization and staff. When major corporate changes occur, this new method may not 
sufficiently account for that change. 
6.0 Potential Future Applications 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Experimental Spaceplane Program 
(XSP) is a currently in-development reusable booster. It is intended to be capable of 10 suborbital flights 
in 10 days, as well as hypersonic cruise missions up to Mach 10. It must also be capable of 
accommodating an expendable upper stage to perform low-Earth orbit missions. It has a cost-per-flight 
requirement of $5M (amortized over a reasonable, finite period). This program was the original impetus 
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for the development of the quantitative scoring methodology. It is currently under consideration for 
incorporation to some extent in order to further increase the likelihood of launch success. 
The promising new commercial launch vehicles such as SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Blue Origin’s New 
Glenn could also profit from this approach, since infant mortality still appears to be a factor. The existing 
legacy expendable launch vehicles (Atlas V and Delta IV) continue to fly and still undergo modifications 
and could also benefit. NASA’s current Space Launch System and Orion programs have been repeatedly 
delayed, and costs continue to escalate (Refs. 19 and 20). This new methodology could help direct 
changes to improve their likelihood of success. Finally, this method can be generalized and applied to 
different types of space propulsive systems (such as in-space electric propulsion). 
7.0 Caveats and Concerns 
There were several concerns raised about this methodology by staff of the NASA Headquarters 
Safety Center; the NASA Glenn Research Center Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance Branch; 
ARES Corporation; and The Aerospace Corporation. While generally acknowledging the shortcomings of 
the more traditional methods and the need for a method such as this one in principle, they urged caution in 
several areas. The authors have accepted many of their suggestions and introduced solutions into the 
methodology as a result. Other concerns were either rejected or merely noted, with reasons given here.  
It was pointed out that successful launches, if subjected to this assessment, would likely result in 
nonzero scores as well. That is, no successful launch is exactly nominal, and failing to incorporate these 
“nonzero score successes” into the cumulative distribution function is not strictly correct. Although this is 
true, the source database did not contain evaluations of successful missions. Thus, this methodology 
produces a “floor” to the probability of failure rather than a “ceiling.” To address this concern, scoring the 
338 postflight reports of successful missions would be needed, just as in the cases of the accident 
investigation board reports of the 21 failed missions. This would require a considerable amount of effort.  
This technique (like most that were discussed in Secs. 3.1 and 3.2) focuses on “errors”—the negative 
actions taken (or not taken). Positive actions (adaptations to new information or feedback loops in 
decision making) by people are typically not incorporated into these methodologies, yet are important in 
the correct representations of what actually takes place. Adaptations and feedback loops (internal and 
external to systems) are widely acknowledged as essential for successful outcomes, and their omission 
represents a meaningful modeling deficiency in assessments of probability of failure. “Failure to consider 
successful versus unsuccessful adaptations prevents comprehensive understanding of human behavioral 
variability” (Ref. 21). 
It was asserted that the sample set was incomplete. That is, it should have also included launch scrubs 
and delays rather than just failures. This assertion was rejected due to the added seemingly infinite 
amount of “what if” speculation that would follow. What if a delay was followed by another delay of no 
attribution to the system, which results in a failure? Is that the fault of the system or not? Which indirect 
delays should be attributed to the system? 
“Color coded” results were generally thought helpful, but the numerical scoring was thought by 
some to imply a precision that did not exist or was largely subjective. As a result, both scoring methods 
were retained. 
It was pointed out that existing methods such as Failure Modes Effects Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, 
Human Reliability Analysis, and others can already accommodate human factors and should be sufficient 
to address human causal issues. However, these methods were rejected after consideration because of 
their anticipated resource-intensive needs (people, time, and funding) if used to evaluate an entire launch 
vehicle system. 
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Another concern was the small sample size of 21 launches used as the basis for this method. While 
this suggests a moderately significant statistical error, it should be recognized that the 16 spacecraft 
missions exhibited similar failures for comparable root causes. Thus, a larger sample size of 21 + 16 = 37 
might be inferred. Further, these are not all identical vehicles, but rather similar vehicles flying different 
spacecraft on different missions. Statistical methods predicated on samples taken from identical elements 
within a sample space may not be appropriate. What is important is a large enough sample space of 
failures so that no category of root causes was overlooked. 
The scoring was greatly influenced by sample space definition: the greater the number of failures 
considered and included in the source data described in Section 4.6, the greater the range of potential 
scores and range of probabilities of failure. In this sample space, the greatest probability of failure was 
5.85 percent (corresponding to a score of >6.25). Some “infant mortality” cases were not included, which 
likely reduced the range of potential failure probabilities. The scoring could be made more representative 
of history by including those cases. 
As was discussed in Section 5.0, a potential major weakness can arise when there is a change in the 
organization that either leads the development or performs the launch operations (or both) between the 
time of application of the method and the launch system’s operation. Implicit in this method is the 
presumption that there is minimal change in the organization. Negating that presumption could greatly 
compromise the prognostication. 
Lastly, the greatest vulnerability to criticism for this methodology might be “20-20 hindsight bias” in 
the scoring. Comprehension of the circumstances surrounding the failure is even more important than 
judging past actions as imprudent or insufficient. Failure (mishap) reports frequently do not describe in 
great detail the various options available to the launch directors, their knowledge, or various competing 
issues that are being struggled with during the pressure-intensive countdown. The obvious poor decision 
in hindsight frequently appears to have been the correct decision in the heat of the moment. Because of 
this, reliance on (even) complete accident investigation board reports and experts with impressive 
comprehensive experience can still be subject to serious, credible criticism (Ref. 21). 
8.0 Summary and Conclusions 
A considerable number and variety of analytic methodologies exist to forecast the probability of 
failure for a major engineering system. Most of these methods are focused on component hardware and 
are statistical in nature. However, it has been shown repeatedly that the root causes of the overwhelming 
majority of past launch vehicle failures are human causal factors, not hardware unreliability, that are 
manifested in a statistical way. Although Probabilistic Risk Assessments, particularly when augmented 
with Human Reliability Analyses are effective, established methods to determine causes of failure for 
specific subsystems, they can be unwieldy and resource intensive if used system-wide to predict all likely 
means of failure for a launch vehicle system still in development.  
A practical, prognostic method based on actual root causes of past failures has been created that can 
be applied to an entire launch vehicle system. Even though it is lacking in precision and strict statistical 
orthodoxy, it is relatively easy to use to generate either qualitative or quantitative results. Its baseline 
formulation is predicated on data from past accident investigation board reports and judgment by two 
nationally recognized experts in launch vehicle development and operations. A cumulative, probabilistic 
distribution function was generated from that analysis. Using that function and scoring based on proven 
human-centric root causes, the method’s resultant predictions of probability of failure for an example case 
was shown to be in reasonable agreement with demonstrated actual performance of the completed launch 
vehicle program. However, the qualitative scoring of the predicted subroot causes of failure were 
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significantly different compared to the actual causes of a failed mission. This was attributed to the 
significant changes in Government and industry leadership and execution of the program, which took 
place between the time of prediction and time of failure.  
This new methodology is currently under consideration by a DARPA launch vehicle development 
program. It could be used in other Government and commercial launch vehicle programs now in varying 
stages of development or upgrading, to assist program management in mitigating the true root causes of 
launch vehicle system failure. Although a numerical score from a failure risk assessment will never be 
actually verified because of the relatively small number of space launches (unlike aircraft or other 
vehicles), the enhanced focus on actions to mitigate human casual factors identified through this method 
should meaningfully improve reliability of future launch vehicle concepts. 
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